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Introduction
Since 1988, Business Week biennially ranks the top business schools in the U.S. This ranking reflects survey questionnaire responses from corporate recruiters, on the one hand, and current and recent graduates, on the other. The reported rankings combine the raw scores of these two sets of survey responses to generate an overall index (ranking).
1 Apart from enhancing the prestige of individual MBA programs, this ranking can significantly influence popular perception about the quality of the MBAs from different schools and, thus, affect their starting salaries. While the survey results rely on qualitative ("subjective") information, Business Week reports quantitative ("objective") information as well.
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Qualitative factors may incorporate a prestige factor based on past accomplishments by an MBA program, not actually reflected in its current experience. Reputations reflect hard-won achievements, but also seem impervious to change from new challengers. In other words, reputation embodies "capital" that proves difficult to squander, once achieved. Moreover, the survey respondents' perception of the quantitative factors may reflect erroneous or incomplete information. In sum, the perceptions recorded in survey findings may significantly differ from the quantitative facts. 3 This paper ranks MBA programs on numerous quantitative ("objective") factors and compares those rankings to the qualitative ("subjective") rankings of the 2004 Business Week survey results.
The ranking of MBA programs may differ depending on the target audience. MBA students may value different criteria for ranking programs as compared to employers. Such variables as increase in salary from pre-to post-MBA program and the number of job offers post-MBA program reflect the interests of the MBA students. Employers, on the other hand, may value such factors as the selectivity of MBA programs, the GMAT scores of entering students, the faculty-student ratio, and the program's budget. That is, the value of the output from MBA programs largely represents the quality of inputs entering the MBA educational (production)
process. Since the MBA programs must serve both the students and the employers, program administrators should value both sets of factors.
Conceptually, a professional education produces the stock of marketable human capital of the individuals graduating from the program. Although far from perfect, the salary offer received on graduation provides a reasonable index of the market value of the human capital. Students enter the MBA programs, however, with varying initial stocks of human capital. Pre-MBA earnings provide an index of the human capital acquired prior to entering the program. Thus, the incremental contribution of the program measures the differential between the pre-and post-MBA annual earnings, after adjusting for the cost of attending the MBA program. 4 Most top-rated MBA programs admit only students with high GMAT scores. Thus, such programs pre-select their quality to public relations efforts to promote MBA-program image.
graduates for a successful post-MBA career. In sum, the extent of "value added" gets overstated.
But, as noted above, employers focus on the quality of new hires (output) and not the value added of the MBA program. Thus, employers flock to "prestigious" MBA programs because of the "perceived" high value of the inputs, which presumably produces high-value outputs (MBA graduates). Gioia and Corley (2002) persuasively argue that since the advent of the Business Week and other ranking systems, business schools face the possible seduction into promoting image over substance. 5 Their balanced approach to analyzing the effects of the Business Week rankings on the environment and culture of business schools identifies positive and negative implications. On the positive side, the Business Week and other rankings expose business schools to enhanced competition, increased the rate of adoption of innovations and new strategies, and improved transparency for more accountability. On the negative side, these subjective rankings fail to deliver on measuring educational quality, relying on subjective perceptions of students and corporate recruiters. Moreover, the ranking really compare MBA programs and not business schools. As such, undergraduate and PhD programs receive short shrift and the quality of faculty members only receives cursory attention. Finally, since the ratings partly reflect the opinion of one customer (students), faculty members face subtle and not-so-subtle pressure to lower the level and difficulty in course material, in effect pandering to customer demands.
A key component of the concerns raised by Gioia and Corley (2002) reflects the subjective nature of the survey of students and corporate recruiters. Our paper partly addresses these concerns 5 Elsbach and Kramer (1996) examine how the Business Week rankings affect perceptions amongst business school faculty members. They conclude that "the rankings posed a two-pronged threat to many members' perceptions … (1) calling into question their perception of highly valued, core identity attributes of their schools, and (2) challenging their beliefs about their school's standing relative to other schools." (p. 442).
by proposing an objective methodology for ranking MBA programs. In this process, we also address the issue of arbitrary and un-normalized weights with our final indexes. That is, we use principal components analysis to develop indexes based on objective information.
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The next section reviews two different attempts to use quantitative data to rank MBA programs -a market-based, value-added approach, and a production-efficiency approach -and then previews our approach -a first-principal-component index of the quantitative information.
Section 3 describes the data and its construction and then provides a descriptive analysis of the data used in our analysis. Section 4 constructs and interprets our alternative rankings based on the firstprincipal-component index. Section 5 concludes.
Reputation and Ranking
This section briefly reviews Tracy and Waldfogel (1997) and Ray and Jeon (2007) , who each use quantitative data to rank MBA programs. Then, we preview our approach to developing a MBA program ranking based on an index of the objective data and subdividing the rankings into rankings that reflect the interests of students, employers, and program administrators. Tracy and Waldfogel (1997) rank business schools employing what they call the "market-based" approach. Using regression analysis, they determine the value added by an MBA program, which they then use to rank MBA programs. 7 Their ranking offers important information to MBA students, but it does not provide good, relevant information to employers 6 We admit that the objective data only include self-reported information from the MBA programs themselves and provided to Business Week. Corley and Gioia (2000) report that one dean asserts that "Business schools lie!" (p. 326).
7 They distinguish between the quality of an MBA program and the quality of its students. They regress the average starting salary (adjusted for differences in cost-of-living) on a number of student attributes and interpret the residual as value added by the program. Their revised ranking of MBA programs does contain a few surprises in that side by side with the heavyweights like Stanford, Harvard, and Chicago, much less recognized programs such as Oklahoma State, New Mexico, and Wake Forest feature in their "Value-Added Top 10" list.
and only partial information for MBA program administrators. For example, a high-value-added program may start with lower quality students. Thus, employers may not find a high ranking that helpful. In other words, while value added may provide important information to MBA students, the total value may represent more valuable information to employers. Most importantly, as noted above, the quality of the inputs used in the production (educational) process determines total value, holding the MBA education value-added constant.
Decision making problems parallel production processes, where desirable outcomes of the decision play the role of outputs while actions or conditions facilitating these outcomes play the role of inputs. Good management education should produce efficient managers. Efficient management of production requires optimal utilization of resources. Efficiency proves inconsistent with either unrealized potential increase in output or avoidable waste of inputs. Ray and Jeon (2007) broaden the discussion of MBA program reputation or ranking to include production efficiency. Employing a production model and data envelopment analysis (DEA), they examine the reputation and production efficiency of MBA programs. 8 9 The production process combines inputs to produce outputs. The calculation of a most efficient frontier then allows the computation of production efficiency for each of the MBA programs in the sample. They measure efficiency in three ways -output-oriented, input-oriented, and global efficiency measures. Output-oriented 8 Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) introduce the DEA method to non-parametrically measure technical efficiency of production units with reference to a technology exhibiting constant returns to scale. Subsequently, Banker, Charnes, and Cooper (1984) generalize the model to accommodate variable returns to scale.
9 A number of studies use DEA to examine production and efficiency in education (e.g., Johnes and Johnes, 1993; Burton and Phimister, 1994; and Breu and Raab, 1994) . Colbert, Levary and Shaner (2000) determine an alternative ranking of U.S. MBA programs based on DEA using the survey response scores reported in the Business Week study. They also compare the U.S. programs with three foreign MBA programs. As pointed out by Tracy and Waldfogel (1997) , a valid ranking should incorporate quantitative criteria that are comparable across programs and should also be based on "outputs" rather than "inputs". The Colbert, Levary, and Shaner (2000) study, like the original Business Week ranking, falls short on this count.
efficiency determines by how much one can technically increase output, using the observed inputs.
Input-oriented efficiency determines by how much one can technically reduce inputs to produce the observed outputs. Finally, the global efficiency measure determines how much one can technically increase outputs and decrease inputs simultaneously to produce on the production frontier.
Similar to Tracy and Waldfogel (1997) and Ray and Jeon (2007) , we also use quantitatively measured "inputs" and "outputs" rather than qualitative scores based on survey responses to rank the individual MBA programs. We explore the reputation or ranking of MBA programs using principal components analysis to generate indexes (i.e., the first principal component Creating an index with which to rank MBA programs faces important conceptual issues. the game playing behavior of business schools. For instance, the salary value added and GMAT scores do not seem subject to institutional corruption. The rejection rate, however, proves the exception. We offer more analysis of these issues when we describe the data. Finally, we also employ principal components analysis to let the data provide the different weight schemes when combining variables linearly that maximize the explained variability of the raw data.
Data Definitions and Descriptive Analysis of MBA Programs
In this study, we consider two outputs and six inputs contained in the business school production process. 12 The first output (gain) measures the difference between the annuitized pre-and post-MBA earnings flow of a representative graduate of the school, which we treat as the value added.
Management education helps the students acquire and develop various management skills, which 12 The Appendix provides more details on data definitions and construction.
make them more valuable to subsequent employers. Therefore, in an efficient market, a graduate with better skills relevant for effective management should receive a higher salary. The second output equals the adjusted placement rate (jobs). More worthy candidates usually generate multiple job offers. Given that the job placement rate does not reach 100 percent, however, we adjust the average number of offers received by the graduates who actually get any offer by the probability that a graduating student possesses an offer in hand.
The six inputs include: (i) the faculty-student ratio (f/s), (ii) the average GMAT score of the incoming class (gmat), (iii) the degree of selectivity in the admission process measured by the percentage of applications rejected (%reject), (iv) the endowment per student (end/stud), (v) the percentage of male students in the class (%male), and (vi) the percentage of U.S. students in the class (%US). The faculty-student ratio measures an important school input. An increase in the faculty-student ratio should contribute positively to the output bundle. We measure the student's background in two alternative ways. One measure equals the percentage of applicants rejected for admission by a school. More selective the schools generate higher rejection rates and better quality graduating students. Self-selection, however, may occur in the applicant pools across MBA programs, where better applicants target only the more reputed MBA programs (e.g., Northwestern or Chicago). In that case, the second quartile of the pool of applicants for one school may include better applicants than the top quartile for another. Hence, an eighty-percent rejection rate for both MBA programs does not imply the same quality of admitted students. In sum, student self-selection adds noise to the information content of the rejection percentage. An alternative selectivity measure equals the average GMAT scores of the in-coming class. In this study, we include both measures of student quality as inputs. Finally, end/stud measures resources (endowment) per student.
When developing efficiency measures for the MBA programs, Ray and Jeon (2007) employ two additional input control variables for these two "qualitative dimensions" of the student input.
Those two demographic variables, %male and %US, reflect characteristics of the students that may affect their salaries without affecting their managerial ability. Due to family constraints, a female MBA exhibits less mobility than the male MBA counterpart in her class, implying a lower female starting salary, on average. Also, a gender bias may exist against female graduates in the market.
For both reasons, a school with a higher proportion of female students may experience a lower expected salary increase (pre-vs. post-MBA). Of course, entry-level differences in male and female salaries may mitigate this potential bias. Similar logic applies for a school with a higher proportion of international students. Due to visa problems, non-U.S.-resident MBAs often accept jobs with lower pay, on average. On the other hand, outstanding foreign-national MBAs may return to their own countries. As a result, the average salaries of those who accept employment in the U.S.
are probably lower. Table A1 in the appendix reports the input-output data for the individual MBA programs used in this study and the group-wise average values. We list the MBA programs based on their ranking in the 2004 Business Week (BW Rank) list. They group into 3 categories -tier-1 MBA programs consist of the top-30 programs, tier-2 MBA programs include the next 20 programs (unranked), and tier-3 MBA programs contain the last 15 programs (unranked). 13 On average, the MBA programs in a higher category achieve higher salary gain and a better placement record than MBA programs from a lower category. At the individual school level, Michigan State shows the highest gain ($41,672), closely followed by Brigham Young University ($39,808) . At the other end, Pepperdine shows a lowest gain of $7,295. In terms of placement, Harvard with 2.4 job offers 13 As noted in footnote 7, we did not obtain the information necessary to calculate the salary gain for three tier3 MBA programs -American, Northeastern, and Rutgers. We eliminate these three tier-3 programs in our analysis, dropping the tier-3 number from 18 to 15. 
Constructing and Interpreting Alternative Rankings of MBA Programs
As noted above, the Business Week rankings of MBA programs combine the raw survey results of students and employers (recruiters) to measure their combined perceptions of the quality of MBA programs. We argue that the combining of surveys, including students and employers, mixes apples and oranges. In this section, we develop several quantitative ("objective") rankings of MBA programs that address the interests of students, employers, and MBA program administrators separately. 15 Moreover, we compare those quantitative rankings with the qualitative ("subjective")
Business Week rankings.
First, consider the interests of the students, which, we argue, reflect the value added (gain) and the adjusted number of job offers (jobs) produced by MBA programs, which capture our output measures. We ranked the MBA programs based on value added and job offers separately. Then we took arithmetic averages of the rankings on these two dimensions and ranked the resulting outcomes to generate an overall output ranking (Output). Further, we applied principal components analysis to gain and jobs and used the weights of the first principal component to construct another overall output index to rank programs (Output-pc). Colbert, Levary, and Shaner (2000) also separate student and employer (recruiter) satisfaction in their analysis. They do not explicitly associate the combined satisfaction measure with the interests of MBA program administrators. 16 The first principal component for the output index produces weights on the normalized value added and adjusted jobs per student variables that equal 0.7071 and 0.7071, respectively. In sum, equal weights apply to value added and adjusted jobs per student. The notes to Tables 1 to 3 also report Spearman rank correlations between our various rankings. Second, consider the interests of the employer, which reflect the faculty-student ratio (f/s), the rejection percentage (%reject), the GMAT score (gmat), and the endowment per student (end/stud) invested by the MBA program into the pool of students attracted to the MBA program, given their screening devices. As we did for our output measures, we rank MBA programs based on each individual input. Next, we compute the simple average of those numerical input rankings and the first principal component of those inputs to generate an overall input (Input) and principal component (Input-pc) rankings. 20 Then, we compare our quantitative ("objective") rankings with 19 The Spearman rank correlation coefficient between the arithmetic average and the principal component rankings equals 0.90. We will discuss in the text only the results based on the principal component ranking, leaving any analysis of the arithmetic average ranking to the reader. 20 The first principal component for the four inputs produces weights on the normalized faculty-student ratio, the GMAT score, the rejection percentage, and the endowment per student variables that equal -0.3683, 0.6348, 0.5847, and 0.3456, respectively. In sum, the highest weights go to the GMAT score and the rejection rate, whereas the faculty student ratio and endowment per student receive smaller weights.
each other and then to the qualitative ("subjective") rankings from the Business Week survey. Table   2 reports the findings with columns 9 and 10 on the differences between our overall input (Input) and the principal component (Input-pc) rankings and between the Business Week (BW Ranking) rankings and our principal component (Input-pc) ranking.
The rankings of MBA programs based on individual inputs generate some interesting observations. Higher rejection percentages or higher GMAT scores associate with a higher
Business Week ranking. That is, higher ranked MBA programs prove much more selective in admitting students into their programs, not a surprise. Also, higher endowment per student associates with a higher Business Week ranking. Unexpectedly, a lower faculty-student ratio associates with a higher Business Week ranking. We interpret this observation as follows. Higher ranked MBA programs in Business Week select students with high ability and promise. Moreover, a low faculty-student ratio implies, on average, a large MBA program. Thus, employers can pick from a large pool of extremely promising students. Conversely, a large faculty-student ratio may signal a small MBA program with many fewer students in any graduating class.
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Unlike our findings for objective output measures, where the ranking based on value added (gain) does not closely correspond to the Business Week ranking, the individual objective input variables produce rankings that uniformly exhibit a closer connection to the Business Week subjective rankings. Among the four input measures, however, the GMA score and the rejection rates possess a closer connection to the Business Week rankings. For example, 5, 4, 2, and 6 MBA programs drop out of the top-10 Business Week rankings when using the faculty student ratio, the 21 Viewed another way, high-reputation MBA programs usually enroll more students, run larger classes, and use a lower faculty-student ratio. Examining the raw Business Week data on faculty and students, higher ranked MBA programs often employ and enroll more faculty and students, respectively, although the enrollment of students rises more rapidly than employment of faculty so that the faculty student ratio falls.
GMAT score, the rejection rate, and the endowment per student to rank programs, respectively.
Further, the number dropping out of the top-20 programs equal 7, 3, 6, and 11. Using the principal components index of inputs to rank MBA programs produces fewer programs jumping from tier-2 or tier-3 to the top 30 than occurs for the principal component index of outputs (see above). Among tier-2 program, Boston University does the best, moving to 19 th , 22 The Spearman rank correlation coefficients between the rankings based on the first principal component index of inputs and the rankings based on the individual inputs faculty student ratio, the GMAT score, the rejection rate, and the endowment per student equal 0.54, 0.84, 0.75. and 0.38, respectively. Also, see footnote 16 where the principal component weights reflect a similar pattern. 23 Once again, we focus on the rankings based on the principal component index. The Spearman rank correlation coefficient between the rankings based on the arithmetic average of inputs and the principal component index equals 0.86.
while among tier-3 programs, Florida does the best, moving to 23 rd .
Third, we consider the interests of MBA program administrators, which, we argue, reflect the interests of the students and employers. That is, program administrators consider both outputs and inputs. We take the objective output and input rankings for individual components developed respectively in Tables 1 and 2 , calculate an arithmetic average across all output and input rankings as well as the first principal component of the outputs and inputs together, producing the combined (Combined) and the principal component (Combined-pc) rankings. 24 Since the Business Week method uses surveys of students and employees, that ranking comes the closest, in spirit to our combined and principal component rankings. The crucial difference, however, remains -our rankings use quantitative ("objective") data while the Business Week survey incorporates qualitative ("subjective") judgment. Columns 7 and 8 in Table 3 report the differences between our combined (Combined) and principal component (Combined-pc) rankings, and those between the Business Week (BW Ranking) and our principal component (Combined-pc) ranking.
The rankings of MBA programs based on arithmetic averages of outputs (Output) and inputs (Inputs) reflect the rankings reported for outputs and inputs in Tables 1 and 2 , respectively.
We report these rankings in Table 3 for ease of comparison with the new rankings in Table 3 The first principal component for the two outputs and four inputs produces weights on the value added, adjusted jobs per student, normalized faculty-student ratio, the GMAT score, the rejection percentage, and the endowment per student variables that equal 0.1201, 0.4988, -0.2928, 0.5431, 0.5117, and 0.3071, respectively. In sum, the adjusted jobs per student, the GMAT scores, and the rejection rate receive similar weighting in the index, whereas the other three variables receive smaller and similar weights with value added the lowest weight. In sum, adjusted jobs per student, the GMAT score, and the rejection rate provide the most information in the principal components index. 25 Once again, we focus on the rankings based on the principal component index. 
Conclusion
The ranking of MBA programs by Business Week provides important information for employers, students, and program administrators. That ranking, however, mixes the responses of students and employers together, giving an overall evaluation of the MBA programs. Students, employers, and program administrators, we argue, potentially possess different interests that should reflect different characteristics in their individual ranking schemes. This paper provides different ranking schemes for these three different groups.
The Business Week ranking relies on the perceptions of the participants in its MBA program survey. That is, survey respondents will use both quantitative and qualitative factors in responding to the survey. Moreover, the survey respondents may not possess accurate information on the quantitative facts. The qualitative factors critically include the reputation of the program receiving a ranking. Reputations take much time and effort to build. But once established, they can persist for a long time, even if the effort to maintain the program slackens after establishing its reputation. Thus, MBA programs attempting to climb in the rankings will feel that the survey does not adequately reward the efforts that they have made to improve their program. In addition, MBA programs with strong reputations may continue to rank highly, even after the quality of the program deteriorates. This paper provides rankings based on quantitative ("objective") factors and compares those rankings to the Business Week rankings that incorporate qualitative ("subjective") factors.
The various rankings divide into three groups as follows. Student rankings reflect two outputs -the gain in income from pre-to post-MBA program adjusted for the cost of attending the program and the average number of job offers received. Employer rankings reflect four inputs -the faculty student ratio, the average GMAT score, the rejection percentage, and endowment per student for the programs. 27 Finally, the MBA program administrator rankings reflect both the outputs and the inputs. We employ two approaches to combining information to achieve an overall ranking -arithmetic averages of the ranking numbers for each of the variables used in the overall ranking and the first principal component drawn from those same variables.
Our two ranking methods both solve a problem that the Business Week rankings do not properly address. To wit, Business Week combines the raw data from the student and corporate recruiter surveys without normalizing the series. As Business Week reports, the corporate recruiter surveys garner more influence in the final ranking, since corporate recruiters exhibit a larger dispersion in ranking MBA programs relative to students. Our unweighted average of the numerical rankings and the weighted first principal component index both normalize the data 27 Note that student self-selection adds some noise to the information content of the rejection percentage.
series, albeit in different ways, so that each attribute possesses the same mean and standard deviation. Thus, in our method, no one attribute achieves undue influence on the final rankings.
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Considering the two output and four input variables, we find that the value added construct provides the least information consistent with the original Business Week ranking. That is, many highly ranked MBA programs do not deliver the value added as some much lesser ranked programs. To the extent that value added becomes an important criteria in a student's decision as to which program to attend, the Business Week ranking proves less than helpful. On this one criteria, some specific tier-2 and tier-3 MBA programs such as Brigham Young, Michigan State, and Arizona deserve careful consideration by students.
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In sum, some MBA programs rise and others fall dramatically in the quantitative ("objective") rankings as compared to the Business Week rankings. Moreover, we observe differences in the reshufflings of the rankings of MBA programs based on whether the focus reflects student, employer, or program administrator interests. 28 The principal component method uses the characteristics of the data series to determine weights in the final index, allowing for different variables to exert more or less influence on the overall ranking index. See discussions in the text.
29 These programs, however, report the 2 nd (Arizona), 3 rd (Brigham Young), and 8 th (Michigan State) lowest pre-MBA salaries of all the programs in the sample. That is, students with high pre-MBA salaries may not achieve the value added at these schools, since they enter the high end of the pre-MBA salary distribution. In other words, if a student possesses a high pre-MBA salary, then choosing an MBA program based on value added may prove problematic. Such high pre-MBA-salary students may not want to pursue an MBA degree unless they matriculate at a high-ranking MBA program in the Business Week survey. Spearman rank correlations between the Input-pc ranking and our faculty-student ratio (f/s), the GMAT score (gmat), the rejection percentage (%reject), the endowment per student (end/stud), and the overall input (Input) rankings equal 0.54, 0.84, 0.75, 0.38, and 0.86, respectively. The higher correlations for the rankings based on the GMAT scores and rejection percentages probably echo the MBA-program-specific information contained in those two variables. That is, the faculty-student and endowment-student ratios incorporate school-wide rather than MBA-program-specific information. Nonetheless, the overall input ranking correlation nearly matches the correlations for the rankings based on rejection percentages and GMAT scores. 
